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Abstract
This paper analyzes empirically the impact of fiscal policy on the price level for the cases
of Germany and Spain. We investigate whether the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL)
is able to deliver a reasonable explanation for the different performances of the price level
in these two countries during recent years. We apply two different approaches. The first is
a Bayesian VAR model using sign restrictions to assess the relation between surpluses and
public debt. Afterwards, we use a Bayesian regime-switching model to uncover changes in
monetary and fiscal policy behavior. The analysis basically shows that in each of the two
countries fiscal shocks have a significant impact on the price level. Nonetheless, the FTPL
does not deliver a reasonable explanation for the differences in the pattern of inflation
between the two countries.
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Figure 1: Inflation in Germany and Spain
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Since the introduction of the Euro as the common currency in twelve member states of the
European Union (EU) in 2002, there has been a steady debate about the effectiveness of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which requires all countries in the Euro Zone to have a deficit
of less than 3% of its GDP. The aim is to prevent excessive government deficits from occurring.
Theory predicts that excessive government deficits may lead to substantial increases in the
overall price level, even if the central bank is independent and hardly fighting inflation.
Government deficits have grown in almost all member states of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) during recent years. In 2003 Germany, Greece, France and the Netherlands had a deficit
ratio of above 3%, while the deficits of Italy and Portugal remained slightly below it. At the
same time the rate of inflation in the EMU was with 2.1% considerably modest1. This raises the
question, whether control of public debt is really a requirement for price stability.
This paper aims to answer this question by investigating German and Spanish data as an
example of two countries which performed very differently in terms of inflation during recent
years, although both countries were subject to the same monetary policy. Figure 1 provides the
run of inflation in both countries for the period 1991-2004. Since 1998, the rate of inflation in
Germany is considerably lower than in Spain. We examine if fiscal policy behavior may deliver
a possible explanation for this development.
1This corresponds to current ECB statistics.
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We will base the analysis on two different approaches. The first goes back to Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2000). We extent and modify this approach by using Bayesian techniques and
sign restrictions for the variables. The second part of the analysis is based on the work of Davig
and Leeper (2005) using a Markov-switching model. Again, we use a Bayesian approach. To our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to test the relevance of the so-called fiscal theory of the price
level (FTPL) for Germany and Spain.
1.2 Literature Review
During the 1990s there has been a considerable amount of literature devoted on the impact
of fiscal policy on inflation. Cornerstones of this theory are the works of Leeper (1991), Sims
(1994), Woodford (1994, 1995, 1996 and 2001) and Cochrane (1998, 2000). While traditional
theory regards the stock of money as the sole determinant of the price level, the FTPL argues
that if fiscal policy is free to set primary surpluses independently of government debt, fiscal
shocks may well have an impact on the price level. Whereas traditional theory assumes that
fiscal authorities adjust primary surpluses to guarantee solvency of the government for any price
level2, the FTPL considers the possibility that fiscal policy is able to set primary surpluses
independently of government debt accumulated. As a result the price level will adjust to make
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint hold at any point of time. Woodford (1995)
refers with the terms ”non-Ricardian” and ”Ricardian” to these two cases of fiscal policy behavior.
While ”Ricardian” fiscal policy describes the case in which primary surpluses may not be set
independently of government debt, ”non-Ricardian” refers to the latter case.
In both cases the intertemporal budget constraint holds in equilibrium. The crucial difference
between the two scenarios is the causal link between prices and surpluses.
Woodford (1996, 1998) argues that fiscal shocks affect aggregate demand in non-Ricardian
environments. Households regard government debt as net wealth affecting their future path of
consumption due to the exogeneity of government deficits.
Sims (1997) argues that government commitments to stable prices can easily turn out to be
unsustainable. Furthermore, there are practical bounds for governments on primary surpluses
and unpredictable disturbances to fiscal balance. For a monetary union Sims concludes that
generally an interest-rate-pegging policy, which is what a monetary union finally is about, can
only work, if each country with an initial level of public debt larger than zero commits itself
to some positive level of primary surpluses in the future. From a game theoretic perspective
each government has an incentive to deviate from this strategy to increase welfare of its own
citizens leading to an upward jump in the price level. The costs of this policy have to be paid by
members of the monetary union. This implies that a monetary union can only survive, if national
governments have to commit themselves to a deficit or surplus rule, i.e. a limit on borrowing as
done by the existing SGP or as Sims argues to a path of some positive primary surpluses.
Cochrane (1998) argues that the “FTPL per se has no testable implications for the time series
of debt, surplus and price level”. The budget constraint of the government written in nominal
terms holds in both Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. If this equilibrium is restored by
2Barro (1974).
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price or surplus adjustments remains unclear3. Hence, all we observe are equilibrium points.
Woodford (1995) supports this view saying that it does not make much sense to test the FTPL
in empirical terms. Heading in the same direction Buiter (1999) states that “[...] the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint is a constraint on the government’s instruments that must be
satisfied for all admissible values of the economy-wide endogenous variables.” So what really
matters for the characterization of fiscal policy behavior is the question, whether prices or future
surpluses of the government adjust to make the government budget constraint hold.
Despite the rather pessimistic view of Woodford there have been some attempts to measure
empirically the effect of fiscal policy on the price level. One of the earliest works dealing with this
question is the paper of Shim (1984). Shim uses a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to analyze
the interdependencies between the rate of inflation and the government budget constraint for
the U.S. and 12 other industrialized countries. He finds little evidence for a strong comovement
between government debt and the price level for most of the countries investigated.
A recent paper by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2000) investigates U.S. data for the period
1951-1995 with a bivariate VAR model in Surplus/GDP and Liabilities/GDP, both quoted in
nominal terms. This VAR specification allows to identify, whether prices or surpluses adjust in
order to make the intertemporal government constraint hold. The paper comes to the conclusion
that fiscal policy in the U.S. may rather considered to be Ricardian than non-Ricardian.
Bohn (1998) finds out that U.S. fiscal surpluses have responded positively to debt. He argues
that this provides evidence that U.S. fiscal policy has been sustainable, and although he does
not directly comment on the FTPL, his results are consistent with those of Canzoneri, Cumby
and Diba.
Janssen, Nolan and Thomas (2002) analyze the impacts of monetary and fiscal policy on the
path of inflation in the UK. This paper is especially remarkable as it is built on almost 300 years
of data starting in 1705. They also conclude that there is little econometric evidence that fiscal
policy has significantly affected the price level or the overall money supply.
For the EMU, Afonso (2002) concludes, applying a panel data approach, that the FTPL is not
supported for the EU-15 countries during the period 1970-2001. The member states of the EMU
tend to react with larger future surpluses to increases in the government liabilities. Therefore,
fiscal policy may not considered to be exogenous implying a rejection of the ”non-Ricardian”
hypothesis.
So far, there seems to be empirical evidence that Ricardian fiscal policies are possible and
likely.
Very recent papers by Davig, Leeper and Chung (2004) as well as Davig and Leeper (2005)
analyze regime switches in both fiscal and monetary policy for the U.S. They distinguish between
active and passive behavior for monetary and fiscal authorities4. Their work shows that tax
cuts always generate wealth effects and non-Ricardian outcomes, as long as there is a positive
probability for an active fiscal policy in the next period. Therefore, their work may be interpreted
as a support of the FTPL mechanism.
Another attempt to examine fiscal policy regimes in the light of Markov switching processes
is carried out by Favero and Monacelli (2005). They investigate U.S. data for the period 1960-
3We will comment on this issue in greater detail within the next section of this paper.
4The terms active and non-Ricardian fiscal policy are equivalent as well as passive and Ricardian.
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2002 and come to similar conclusions, namely that fiscal policy has switched between active and
passive regimes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we assess data for Germany
and Spain using a Bayesian version of the approach developed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba
(2000). Following the method of Uhlig (1999) we impose sign restrictions on the impulse responses
of the two variables included, i.e. Surplus/GDP and Liabilities/GDP. The rationale for this is
outlined throughout the next section. After the interpretation of the results obtained we check
in section 3 if these conclusions coincide with those we may draw from the procedure of Davig
and Leeper (2005) using a Markov-switching model. Finally, in section 4 we briefly summarize
the findings and comment on the policy implications arising from the analysis, i.e. if fiscal policy
is a determinant of the price level in Spain or in Germany. Furthermore, we attempt to answer




In the following we will basically apply the method of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2000) to
find out, whether fiscal policy in Germany and Spain may be regarded as being Ricardian or
non-Ricardian. The VAR will be estimated using a Bayesian approach, which imposes sign
restrictions on the impulse responses. The rationale for this procedure as well as the details of
this empirical approach will be outlined later on.
2.1 The Theoretical Foundation of the Model
The government’s budget constraint written in nominal terms for period t is naturally given by




where Mt denotes the stock of base money and Bt the stock of government debt outstanding
at the beginning of period t. At this point it is important to notice that Bt and Mt are quoted in
nominal terms and their values are fixed at the beginning of each period. The real value of these
two variables is determined by the price level. The difference between taxes Tt and government
expenditures Gt in period t yields the primary surplus. it is the nominal interest rate at time t.
(2.1) states that government liabilities outstanding in period t have to be be repaid by either
running a surplus in the same period, monetized by increasing the stock of base money, or
financed by issuing new debt at the beginning of the next period.


















On the left-hand side of (2.2) we find the ratio of total government liabilities and GDP. As a
short form of writing total government liabilities in period t we use Lt in the following.
At first glance the right-hand side seems to be somewhat more complicated. Tt−Gt
Ptyt
is the
primary surplus of the government in period t set in relation to nominal GDP. When we think
of the government as renting the money supply to the private sector5 charging it
1+it
, then the
second term represents the central bank transfers also set in relation to current nominal GDP.
Thus, the first two terms on the right-hand side of (2.2) add up to the total surplus-GDP ratio
of the government, which we will denote in the following by St/Yt. In the notation introduced
above Mt+1+Bt+1
Pt+1yt+1




real growth of GDP and the denominator gives the real interest rate using the well-known Fisher
equation. Thus, we may interpret this term as a discount factor of next period’s total government
liabilities. In the following we will refer to this discount factor as βt.
This enables us to simplify (2.2) so that we obtain











Iterating this equation forward and recursively substituting Lt+1
Yt+1


















with Et being the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t. This
flow budget constraint has to be fulfilled at any point of time, which can be achieved in two
ways6:
1. Consider the case in which the surpluses follow an endogenous process so that (2.4) is
fulfilled by adjustments in the sequence of St, whereby the values of the discount factor βt
and nominal GDP Yt are determined outside the system. We refer to this type of fiscal
policy behavior as Ricardian as both real GDP and inflation remain unaffected by changes
of the fiscal variables.
2. Let the sequence of primary surpluses be determined by an arbitrary exogenous process.
Now, to make (2.4) hold, either the discount factor or the liabilities-GDP ratio have to
move. As mentioned before we assume nominal government liabilities to be fixed at the
beginning of each period. That means that the numerator in Lt
Yt
remains unchanged as it
was the case before in the Ricardian scenario. Hence, equality of (2.4) can only be restored
through Yt in the numerator which also implies an impact on the discount factor βt. Fiscal
policy is said to be non-Ricardian.
That means, whenever surpluses are set independently of the stock of government debt ac-
cumulated, nominal income is determined by fiscal policy actions. By definition, nominal GDP
is the product of real GDP yt and the price level Pt. Thus, an increase in nominal GDP will
generally affect both real GDP as well as the price level7.
Using these basic insights in the FTPL we now try to figure out which of the variables con-
sidered above responds to changes in the fiscal variables using German and Spanish data.
2.2 The Model
In the following we investigate how total government liabilities divided by nominal GDP react
to changes in the surplus-GDP ratio.
Assume that St
Yt
increases in period t. Then, if fiscal policy is Ricardian we should either
expect future surpluses to decrease or to use the surplus to repay the debt, if possible. Thus,
6Note that the stock of total nominal government liabilities Bt + Mt is fixed at the beginning of each period.
7A theoretical quantification of the impact fiscal policy has on both real GDP and inflation can be found for
instance in Woodford (1996).
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an indicator for a Ricardian policy behavior would be a negative or zero-response of Lt/Yt to a
positive shock in St/Yt. This Ricardian interpretation would only be reasonable, if the surplus
shock is persistent in a sense that it does not immediately changes in sign to a deficit shock so
that the impact is immediately diminished. For this reason it will be important to regard the
pattern of St/Yt for conclusions about the character of the shock.
The non-Ricardian case is somewhat easier to describe in terms of the results we should expect.
A non-Ricardian fiscal policy is definitively at work if the reaction of Lt/Yt is positive to a positive
shock in St/Yt for reasons which should be obvious from equation (2.4). Furthermore, a negative
response of Lt/Yt should also considered to be non-Ricardian, if St/Yt is significantly negatively
autocorrelated, i.e. the shock is not persistent and quickly changes in sign.



























where the B(s) is a set of p (m × m) coefficient matrices with m denoting the number of
dependent variables included (m = 2). ut is Gaussian with zero mean and
E[utu
′
t|(St−s/Yt−s; Lt−s/Yt−s)] = Ω (2.6)
with Ω being the positive definite symmetric and time-invariant covariance matrix of size
(m×m). It is often referred to the inverse of Ω as the precision matrix H. Following Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2000) we set the lag length p to two.
In opposite to Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba we choose a Bayesian instead of a classical approach
to avoid any problems arising from potential non-stationarity of the data. Bayesian inference
has the advantage that it does generally not raise specific difficulties like classical inference
when the data analyzed is non-stationary. The application of Bayes’ theorem does not require
the data to be stationary. The same is true for the conditional log likelihood function which
is one pillar of the Bayesian approach in the determination of the parameters’ joint posterior
probability density function (pdf). Furthermore, the Bayesian approach allows us to express the
information we have about the parameters under consideration by specifying the prior density of
the parameters, which includes the specification of our beliefs about the presence of a unit root
in the data analyzed.
When examining the data for both Germany and Spain it should be quite obvious that gov-
ernment liabilities as well as government liabilities divided by GDP is steadily increasing for
almost the entire observation period. That means that the sample data is not mean reverting
and hence not stationary in a common sense. When we perform a formal ADF test for the series
of Liabilities/GDP for each of the two countries the null of a unit root may not be rejected.
This result is interesting. Of course, the result, i.e. the non-stationarity of Liabilities/GDP, is
statistically reasonable, but from an economic point of view it implies that any point between
plus and minus infinity is equally likely. If this were really true for the series of Liabilities/GDP,
fiscal policy would definitively not be sustainable as government debt may grow without bound.
A classical approach would require an estimation of the VAR in differences in order to obtain
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statistically correct results. But this procedure would be problematic from an economic point
of view for the same reasons as stated above, i.e. we would implicitly assume a random walk
behavior for the pattern of government debt, which leads to a non-sustainability of fiscal policy.
By applying a Bayesian approach we still allow for these scenarios to occur, when choosing an
appropriate prior, but we do not impose any restrictions of stationarity or non-stationarity on
the data during the analysis. Thus, we do not assume that the series of Liabilities/GDP will
actually tend towards infinity as we would do, when accepting the null of the ADF test and
consequently estimating the VAR in differences.
From a Bayesian perspective the data is seen as deterministic, whereas the model’s parameters
are stochastic. Within a Bayesian analysis we aim at finding the posterior distribution of the
parameters. This posterior distribution is obtained in two steps. First, we choose a prior pdf,
which expresses our prior beliefs about the coefficients in B(s) and the covariance matrix Ω.
Afterwards, we may compute the likelihood function, i.e. the joint pdf of the data conditional
on the unknown parameters.
As Uhlig (1994) suggests it is reasonable to assume a Normal Wishard distribution for the
prior and the posterior pdf, φNW (B,H|B̄, N, S, v), with B̄ being the mean coefficient matrix
of size (p × m), S the positive definite mean covariance matrix of size (m × m), N a positive
definite matrix of size (p × p) and finally v ≥ 0 denotes the degrees of freedom to describe the
uncertainty about B and Ω around (B̄, S). The precision matrix of the prior distribution H
follows a Wishard distribution of the form Wm(S
−1/v, v). For the specification of the prior we
have to choose values for B̄, S,N, v.
We assume that our prior information is diffuse so that basically the parameters in B(s) may
take any value in the interval −∞ to ∞ with equal probability. This implies that our prior
beliefs are best represented by a flat prior. We obtain a flat prior by setting N0 = v0 = 0 and
B̄0 as well as S0 arbitrarily.
Thus, the analysis applies to both explosive and nonexplosive cases. If the process is actually
explosive or not, will be determined by the sample information we have8. That means that
inferences are unaffected by information external to the current data9.
As stated above we aim at examining the reaction of Lt/Yt to a positive shock in St/Yt.
Generally, this reaction or impulse response may be both positive and negative in sign. When
we do not differentiate between these two scenarios in the analysis we may possibly obtain an
“average” response, which may be misleading in measuring and evaluating the impacts of a shock.
Furthermore, we know from the theoretical considerations given above that a positive response
of Lt/Yt leads to a non-Ricardian interpretation of the data in the corresponding period.
For the case differentiation between responses which are positive and negative in sign we have
chosen the pure-sign-restriction approach by Uhlig (2004). Using this approach we only consider
those cases in which the orthogonalized impulse responses head for the desired direction in the
period the shock takes place10. We divide the sample in those impulse responses which are
8For a general discussion on choosing the appropriate prior pdf, the interested reader may have a look at
Zellner (1971).
9See Gelman et al. (1995).
10The sign restriction is binding for only one period.
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candidates for a Ricardian interpretation and those which are candidates for a non-Ricardian
interpretation, i.e.
1. A positive (negative) shock in St/Yt immediately leads to a zero or negative (positive)
impact on Lt/Y t.
2. A positive (negative) shock in St/Yt immediately leads to a positive (negative) impact on
Lt/Y t.
Our focus will then lie on the question, if the further process, i.e. the process of the two
variables after the shock has occurred also matches a Ricardian pattern in case of scenario 1
and how many of the draws generally match scenario 1 and 2. We made 1,000 draws from the
reduced-form posterior density and for each reduced-form draw 50 draws of the α-vector11.
2.3 The Data
The data we use corresponds to statistics of the International Monetary Fund. All data is denoted
in nominal terms. For monetary liabilities Mt we take money in circulation. Government debt
Bt is represented by the total government debt which includes in the case of Germany both
debt of federal and federal state authorities. Lt is then defined as the sum of total government
debt Bt and money in circulation Mt. For St we correspondingly choose to take the difference
of total government revenues and expenditures. Nominal GDP Yt is seasonally adjusted. The
data has a quarterly frequency and starts for Germany with the 1st quarter 1970 and ends in
the 4th quarter 1998. To take the German reunification into account we split the German data
in two periods, that means we first analyze the time span 1970-1990 and afterwards 1991-1998.
Unfortunately, the Spanish data covers only the period from 1986-1998. Data before 1986 is only
partially available.
2.4 The Results
In the following we give the results for both countries in form of the impulse responses of the two
variables to a one-standard-deviation shock in St/Yt. All impulse responses show the median
response as well as the 18% and 84% quantiles corresponding to a one standard deviation band
if the distribution was normal.
2.4.1 Germany
Figure 2 shows the results obtained for Germany based on the sample 1970-1990. We can see
that a positive shock in St/Yt leads to a significant and persistent negative impact on Lt/Yt
in the first period. This should not be surprising as we used a sign restriction on the impulse
responses to exclude all those cases in which a positive Surplus-GDP shock leads to a positive
11Details about the meaning of the α-vector may be found in the appendix.
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Figure 2: Germany, Response to a Surplus/GDP Shock for the Period 1970-1990 in % with 68%
Error Bands.
impact on Lt/Yt. The fact that the impact of the shock seems to be persistent and significant in
the process of Lt/Yt for a horizon of 10 years suggests a fairly Ricardian interpretation of figure
2. The initial shock vanishes quite fast after 2.5 years, but it does not change in sign which
gives further evidence for a Ricardian fiscal policy behavior12. That means that with the sign
restriction imposed, we obtained those results which allow for a Ricardian interpretation. More
important now is to consider the fraction of draws that match the priors for the sign restriction.
This number was computed as 72.43%. That means that about 30% of all impulse responses
drawn from the posterior distribution does not follow the sign restriction imposed which may be
seen as a necessary condition for a fiscal policy to be Ricardian. Thus, about one-third of the
draws seem to follow a non-Ricardian policy behavior.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the two variables when hit by a one-standard-deviation shock
in St/Yt for Germany during the period 1991-1998. We can see that both processes are somewhat
different to the ones we obtained before. Again, as induced by the sign restriction the shock in
St/Yt is positive for the first period. In opposite to the earlier sample the Surplus-GDP ratio
changes in sign after about two quarters. The lower error band has its minimal value at about
-0.25%. This seems to suggest a rather non-Ricardian policy behavior since the initial shock
itself is hardly persistent. Lt/Yt reacts negatively as indicated by the the upper error band
which remains strictly below zero. Although the impact on Lt/Yt is significant and persistent,
it is questionable if figure 3 shows Ricardian results. Furthermore, for about 35% of the draws
12We also estimated the VAR with 4-6 lags. The results obtained were similar.
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Figure 3: Germany, Response to a Surplus/GDP Shock for the Period 1991-1998 in % with 68%
Error Bands.
positive Surplus-GDP shocks lead to a positive impact on the Liabilities-GDP ratio and hence
to a clearly non-Ricardian pattern.
Up to here we may summarize for the case of Germany that for the period 1970-1990 fiscal
policy may considered to be mainly Ricardian. Nonetheless, there is a substantial part of draws
which does not match the prerequisites constituting a Ricardian policy. From 1991 onwards it is
hard to find sufficient evidence for Ricardian fiscal policy behavior as the surplus shock vanishes
quite rapidly.
2.4.2 Spain
The results for Spain are given in figure 4. Basically they show the same pattern as those for
Germany during the period 1970-1990. After the shock has occurred, St/Yt moves quite rapidly
towards zero. The error bands are almost symmetric around zero within a range of less than
0.1%. Thus, although the lower error band becomes smaller than zero, we should not regard
this as a violation of the Ricardian requirements since the the extent of the change in sign is
considerably small. Also Lt/Yt delivers a purely Ricardian picture under the sign restriction as
the initial negative response is persistent and significant. With 59.8% of the draws matching
the sign restriction of scenario 1 the share of impulse responses that are Ricardian candidates is
lower than in Germany during 1970-1990. Non-Ricardian outcomes seem to be more likely.
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Figure 4: Spain, Response to a Surplus/GDP Shock for the Period 1986-1998 in % with 68%
Error Bands.
2.5 Conclusions and Outlook
So far, the analysis shows Ricardian and non-Ricardian equilibria in both countries. Ricardian
outcomes seem to be slightly more frequent as non-Ricardian. During the period 1991-1998 non-
Ricardian characteristics seem to be predominating in Germany’s fiscal policy. Also Spain shows
a large share of non-Ricardian equilibria.
The approach chosen to test for the occurrence of non-Ricardian equilibria is fairly simple, but
allows to figure out whether the general requirements for a Ricardian fiscal policy are fulfilled.
While common VAR approaches yield some kind of average responses to the shock in question,
the sign restriction used here allows us to differentiate between those impulse responses that are
potential candidates for Ricardian equilibria and those which are not. Unfortunately, it does not
tell us anything about the temporal distribution of the two policy states. Besides this drawback
the previous analysis exhibits another problem, which is less obvious. Davig, Leeper and Chung
(2004) state that the approach applied above considers equilibria that “are potentially ones with
an unbounded debt-output ratio”. Davig, Leeper and Chung argue that the deficit-debt approach
does not require the fiscal response to be strong enough to make the evolution of government
debt stable. Suppose there is a positive shock in the Surplus-GDP ratio in period t and Lt/Yt
does - as we imposed by the sign restriction - respond negatively. Furthermore, let us assume
that the responses of both variables are persistent and significant in the desired direction as
outlined above so that we may conclude that fiscal policy seems to be Ricardian. For this case
Davig, Leeper and Chung say that a significant negative impact on Lt/Yt does not necessarily
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lead to a Ricardian fiscal policy behavior, as there may be an unobserved impact on Yt in the
denominator so that not the entire surplus is used to repay the outstanding debt. This basically
allows for unbounded debt-output ratios.
The preceding analysis should be seen as a first indicator whether Ricardian or non-Ricardian
equilibria have occurred. Thus, our analysis for Spain and Germany has shown that there have
not only been potential Ricardian equilibria throughout the sample but more important that
there have definitively been non-Ricardian outcomes. This is a quite powerful result, which
holds regardless of the arguments made by Davig, Leeper and Chung.
In the following section we proceed with the approach of Davig and Leeper (2005) based on a
Markov-switching model.
3 Regime-Switching Approach
Throughout this section we consider a Bayesian analysis of the Markov-switching approach chosen
by Davig and Leeper. We aim at uncovering changes in monetary and fiscal policy behavior with
the help of simple policy rules.
Before we start with the actual analysis, we first provide the reader with the definitions used
in the following and the theoretical considerations underlying the empirical model. We then give
a brief introduction to Bayesian analysis of linear Markov-switching regression models. More
mathematical details may be found in the appendix.
3.1 Theoretical Background and Definitions
The FTPL implies that both the specification of monetary and fiscal policy is important in
determining the price level. Whenever fiscal policy becomes active, i.e. deficits are exogenous
and set regardless of public debt outstanding, fiscal shocks necessarily have an impact on the
price level. The size of this impact is among other things determined by the characteristics of
monetary policy.
We model the behavior of monetary and fiscal authorities by assuming the following policy
rules:
1. For monetary policy we estimate a Taylor rule specification, which expresses the nominal
interest rate, it, as a function of inflation, πt, and output, Yt, at time t,
it = α0(S
M
t ) + απ(S
M
t )πt + αY (S
M
t )Yt + σiε
i
t. (3.1)
SMt denotes the state of monetary policy at time t. We assume that monetary regimes
evolve according to a Markov chain with corresponding transition matrix PM . We allow
for two different states of the parameters.
2. Following Davig and Leeper we choose a policy rule that links current government revenues




t )Gt + γY (S
F
t )Yt + γB(S
F
t )Bt + σ∆ε
∆
t , (3.2)
where SFt is the fiscal policy regime at time t, which likewise the monetary policy regime
follows a Markov chain with a transition matrix P F . The remaining variables correspond
to the conventional notation: τt denotes the government’s tax yields in period t, Bt stands
for public debt outstanding and finally Yt is output in period t. ε
∆
t is an i.i.d. random
shock and σ∆ the corresponding time-invariant standard error.
By estimating the policy rules as given above we try to figure out, if and when monetary and
fiscal policy have been active or passive. Following Taylor (1993) we consider monetary policy
to be active if απ > 1 and passive if απ ≤ 1. For fiscal policy to be passive it requires that γb > 0
so that a larger stock of public debt outstanding significantly decreases government deficits.
Correspondingly, the case in which γB ≤ 0 is referred to as an active fiscal policy behavior.
Theory has shown that only a combination of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy
leaves the price level unaffected by fiscal policy shocks. Following the literature we refer to this
scenario as a Ricardian regime.
3.2 Bayesian Analysis of Markov-Switching Models
The Bayesian analysis of Markov-switching models goes back to McCulloch and Tsay (1993).
They show that Bayesian estimation of Markov-switching models is kept relatively simple when
using the Gibbs sampler. Gibbs sampling belongs to the class of iterative Monte Carlo methods.
It solves the problem of drawing samples from a multivariate density by drawing successive
samples from corresponding univariate densities. The exposition given in the following is based
on Harris (1999) and Krolzig (1997).
Consider a VAR13 of order p, where the parameters can take on k different states S,




BhS(t)xt−h + εt(St), (3.3)
where εt(St) is an normally distributed i.i.d. error term with mean zero and regime-dependent
covariance matrix Ω(St). µ(St) denotes a constant and B
h
S(t) is the matrix of coefficients for
the hth lag included in state St. Furthermore, we define the transition probabilities for a switch
from regime i to regime j as pij = p(St = j|St−1 = i). We summarize these probabilities in the
transition matrix P with size (k × k).
Let λ denote the set of all unknown parameters, i.e.
λ = [µ(1), . . . , µ(k), B(1), . . . , B(k), Ω(1), . . . , Ω(k), P ] .
13We consider the more general case of a multivariate process. The results similarly apply to univariate
processes.
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In partitioned notation this boils down to λ = [Θ, P ]. Inference on λ depends on the posterior
distribution
p(λ|X) ∝ π(λ)p(X|λ), (3.4)
where X ′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
T ) is the vector of observations and π(λ) the prior for the parameter
vector. Since we are in Markov-regime switching environment, we have additional unknown
parameters given by the unobservable states. Therefore, the posterior density (3.4) is obtained




Using the Gibbs sampler we may draw successive samples from univariate distributions for
λ and S, namely Pr(S|X,λ) and p(λ|X,S) instead of the multivariate distribution p(λ, S|X).
The Gibbs sampler constructs a Markov chain on (λ, S) such that the limiting distribution of
the chain is the joint distribution of p(λ, S|X). There are two types of Gibbs sampler, single-
move and multi-move, which differ in the way the states S are generated. We apply multi-move
sampling as it - according to Liu, Wong and Kong (1994) - will lead to a faster convergence than
single-move sampling.
The idea of multi-move Gibbs sampling is to draw all states in S at once conditional on the
observations. The starting point is to make use of the structure of the underlying Markov chain,
i.e.
Pr(S|X,λ) = Pr(ST |X,λ)
T−1∏
t=1
Pr(St|St+1, xt, λ). (3.6)
The probabilities Pr(ST |X,λ) can be calculated using the filter introduced by Hamilton (1989)
after having chosen initial values for Pr(S0|X). As we are not able to say anything about St for
t < 1, we assume that the economy was in a steady state in t = 0. This enables us to choose
steady-state probabilities for Pr(S0|X), which are easy to compute. We then may generate
Pr(ST |X,λ), which allows us to compute Pr(St|St+1, xt, λ) by







The regimes can now be jointly generated according to (3.6). It is then possible to draw the
unknown parameters from the conditional densities
p(Θj|S, Θ−j, X) ∝ L(X|S, λ) · p(Θj) (3.8)
p(P |S, Θ, X) ∝ p(Sq|P )
T∏
t=q+1
p(St|St−1, P ) · p(P ). (3.9)
In the following section we give a brief overview of the data we used for the analysis and then
provide the results obtained. Some further details on the mathematical backgrounds of Bayesian
analysis of Markov-switching models may be found in the appendix.
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3.3 The Data
For government debt we take the data as described in section 2.3. In contrast to the deficit-
debt approach, GDP is provided in real terms. Government expenditures are related to total
expenditures. German nominal interest rates are represented by the 3-month interbank deposit
rate. For Spain we take the so-called Bank of Spain rate. The rate of inflation is for both
countries given by annual changes in the CPI. Except for the interest rates we computed annual
percentage changes for all variables. The data set corresponds to IMF statistics.
3.4 The Results
In the following we provide the estimated parameters of the fiscal and monetary policy rule as
well as the temporal distribution of the regimes. For the estimation we use a Matlab-based code
which makes 30,000 draws for each scenario from the corresponding posterior distribution. The
prior pdf of the transition probabilities pij are assumed to follow a β-distribution.
3.4.1 Germany
Figure 5 shows the temporal distribution of the regimes underlying the monetary policy rule
during period the 1970-1990. We observe significant switches from regime 1 to regime 2 and
vice-versa. Regime 2 was predominating German monetary policy during the observation period,
particularly the 1980s. The parameter estimates given in the appendix clearly show that regime
2 describes an active policy rule as the parameter for inflation απ is significant and larger than
one14. Also GDP turns out to be significant and enters with a positive sign.
Regime 1 dominating most of the 1970s is characterized by a significant and positive influence
of inflation on interest rates, while GDP turns out to be not significant at all. As απ is smaller
than one we may say that regime 1 describes a passive monetary policy behavior.
These results are plausible. The Bundesbank responded to the oil price shocks at the beginning
of the 1970s with an active monetary policy fighting strongly inflation. During the 1980s when
the German economy experienced slow growth, interest rates were kept at a low level as predicted
by regime 2. Both active and passive monetary policy regimes have occurred during the 1970s
and 1980s in Germany. The 1970s were dominated by a passive monetary policy rule except
for the two years after the oil price shocks took place, while the 1980s were characterized by an
active policy rule.
In figure 6 the temporal distribution of fiscal regimes are similarly reported. Except for the
early 1970s and the late 1980s German fiscal policy was almost exclusively described by regime
2. At first glance, the estimated coefficients for the fiscal policy rule suggest a passive interpre-
tation of regime 2 as annual changes in debt turn out to be significant and positive in modeling
revenues. This suggests that fiscal authorities will generally try to respond to positive changes
in government debt with larger tax yields. Nonetheless, we propose that regime 2 is only weakly
passive as the reaction of revenues to positive changes in government debt is not strong enough
14Taylor (1993).
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Figure 5: Germany, Monetary Policy Rule, Temporal Distribution of Regime Probabilities for
the Period 1970-1990.






























Figure 6: Germany, Fiscal Policy Rule, Temporal Distribution of Regime Probabilities for the
Period 1970-1990.
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to reduce deficits persistently and stabilize the path of public debt. The major aim of running a
fiscal policy as the one described by regime 2 is to stimulate growth and not to return to a stable
path of debt as γY is significant and highly positive such that fiscal policy follows a countercycli-
cal pattern. Therefore, we think that it is reasonable to call regime 2 weakly passive. Government
expenditures do not seem to affect revenues at all as indicated by the 95% confidence band. This
implies that increased expenditures in the current period will leave the tax yields unaffected so
that we should expect a rise of the debt level in the short run.
In contrast to that, regime 1 exhibits not only a significant debt coefficient but also a highly
positive one. Therefore, an interpretation towards a passive fiscal policy regime seems to be
reasonable. Furthermore, government expenditures show at least some significant influence while
GDP is not significant at all.
These results are plausible as they cover a lot of issues in actual German fiscal policy behavior
during the observation period. Till the end of the 1960s government debt was hardly changing
and almost negligible. In response to a drastic jump in the stock of public debt combined with
growing government expenditures in the year 1967 fiscal authorities increased tax revenues to
return to a balanced budget in the following years. This behavior is well described by regime 1
as both debt and expenditures are significant. In 1972 and even more strongly in 1974 deficits
started to increase again while expenditures steadily grew till the end of the 1980s. Regime
2 exhibits these characteristics as debt is still significant but with a smaller coefficient than
in regime 1. At the same time the government tried to stimulate growth as indicated by γY
while allowing for a larger stock of debt. Finally, towards the end of the 1980s the growth rate of
government expenditures was reduced and tax revenues increased particularly in 1989 to stabilize
the debt process. The peak in 1982 in favor for the active regime 1 can be related to freezing of
expenditures.
Hence, for the period 1970-1990 there have been switches between active and passive monetary
policy and passive and weakly passive fiscal policy. From the beginning of the 1970s till the mid
of the 1980s fiscal policy has been weakly passive, while the early 1970s and the late 1980s show a
purely passive pattern. Due to the general passiveness of fiscal policy for most of the observation
period we may expect rather Ricardian outcomes in which the price level is not determined by
fiscal policy actions.
An analysis of monetary policy after the German reunification shows that there have been
no changes in the underlying parameters as the distribution of the regime parameters in figure
7 demonstrates. As απ(S
M
t = 1) is larger than one the underlying regime may be considered
as active, while regime 2 constitutes a passive monetary policy regime. This implies that for
the entire period 1992-1998 monetary policy was active responding positively to both changes in
inflation and GDP.
Turning to the characteristics of fiscal policy we see that except for 1992 regime 1 is slightly
more likely than regime 2. While in the period 1970-1990 the fiscal policy rule specification was
able to explain the process of revenues quite good as the standard error of regression suggested, σ
has now become very large. The same is true for the standard errors of the coefficients and their
confidence bands. As the confidence bands for γG and γY make up an interval around zero, we
assume that government expenditures and GDP are not significant. The only remaining variable
is debt. The estimate for γB is characterized by large standard errors so that the policy rule is
19






























Figure 7: Germany, Monetary Policy Rule, Temporal Distribution of Regime Probabilities for
the Period 1991-1998.






























Figure 8: Germany, Fiscal Policy Rule, Temporal Distribution of Regime Probabilities for the
Period 1991-1998.
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not able to capture satisfyingly movements in tax revenues. Thus, we conclude that tax revenues
during 1992-1998 follow a rather exogenous process.
Again, we should ask ourselves whether these results are economically plausible. The German
economy was exposed to inflationary pressures right after the unification. The Bundesbank re-
acted to this upward movement in the price level with an active monetary policy. As inflation
returned to lower levels towards the end of the observation period we observe a declining proba-
bility for the active monetary regime 1 in figure 7. At the same time, fiscal policy was affected
by one-time effects related to the reunification. Till 1994 debt and expenditures grew without
much response of tax yields. This explains the activeness of fiscal policy as described by regime
1.
The analysis has shown so far that there have been switches between passive and active
monetary policy behavior particularly before 1991. Even more important is the result that
fiscal policy has been at least weakly passive during the period 1970-1998, which constitutes
Ricardian outcomes. The later sample shows significant evidence for non-Ricardian equilibria.
3.4.2 Spain
Figure 9 shows the estimated temporal distributions of monetary policy regimes in Spain. We
can see that it is hard to define significant regime switches for the specified monetary policy rule.
This raises the question if there have been regime changes in Spanish monetary policy at all or
if we may regard the two regimes as basically identical. The estimates for απ show no significant
difference as the confidence bands exhibit. Regime 1 and 2 are overlapping each other widely.
Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that the character of monetary policy in Spain has been
stable in a sense that the reaction of monetary authorities to changes in the price level has been
similar at any point of time. That means there have not occurred any regime switches. The
categorization in active and passive policy behavior is somewhat more difficult than for Germany
as the parameter estimates are provided with quite large confidence bands. The mean as well
as the median of απ is greater than one. Furthermore, the confidence bands are rather located
in the region of απ > 1 than below it. Therefore, it should be reasonable to consider Spanish
monetary policy as active. GDP seems to contribute little to the explanation of interest rates.
The results for the fiscal policy rule given in figure 10 are also less precise than the ones
we obtained for Germany. We can see that except for the years 1991 and 1997 regime 1 was
slightly more probable than regime 2. The estimates for γB combined with the corresponding
confidence bands imply a non-significance of public debt in regime 1, while the opposite is true
for regime 2. Therefore, we may say that regime 1 constitutes an active, regime 2 a passive fiscal
policy behavior. Besides the noncyclical characteristics of any of the two fiscal regimes and the
significance of government expenditures in regime 1, it is important to notice that the fit is very
poor as indicated by the large standard error of regression σ. This should not be surprising as
we could prove that regime 1, which was in place for most of the time, describes active behavior
of fiscal authorities implying an exogeneity of tax revenues. Hence, if tax revenues follow an
exogenous process and are consequently not explained by the variables included in the fiscal
policy rule, the standard error of regression should indeed become quite large.
Recapitulating we may say that for the period 1986-1998 a combination of active fiscal and
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Figure 9: Spain, Monetary Policy Rule, Temporal Distribution of Regime Probabilities for the
Period 1986-1998.






























Figure 10: Spain, Fiscal Policy Rule, Temporal Distribution of Regime Probabilities for the Period
1986-1998.
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monetary policy behavior was predominant in the Spanish economy. Therefore, fiscal policy
shocks will necessarily have impacts on the price level.
These results are supported by the works of De Castro (2003) and Diaz-Roldan and Montero-
Soler (2005). De Castro shows that on the one hand growing government expenditures have no
significant impact on tax yields in Spain and on the other hand that increases in taxes have
no persistent positive influence on budget deficits. Diaz-Roldan and Montero-Soler find that
Spanish monetary policy was characterized by a strong impact of inflation on interest rates.
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4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The analysis has shown that fiscal policy plays a significant role in the determination of the price
level in Germany as well as in Spain. We could show that the FTPL is a relevant mechanism
in explaining the data. These results hold regardless of the approach chosen for the analysis.
Both deficit-debt and regime-switching approach offer a consistent picture as they suggest an
entirely non-Ricardian interpretation for Germany in the period 1991-1998, a mainly Ricardian
policy behavior for Germany during 1970-1990, and a mostly non-Ricardian behavior for Spain.
Hence, differences in the rate of inflation between the two countries during recent years cannot
be traced back to the non-relevance of the FTPL in Spain or Germany.
The deficit-debt approach with sign restrictions turned out to be useful as a general indicator
for the existence of non-Ricardian equilibria. In direct comparison of the two approaches we can
say that it requires at least 70% of draws fitting the Ricardian sign-restriction to allow for a
mainly Ricardian interpretation of the data. The sign-restriction approach should be especially
valuable in small samples and used as a supplementary instrument to check for the existence of
non-Ricardian equilibria. Furthermore, it gives a simple way to test for the plausibility of the
results obtained with the help of the regime analysis.
The significance of the FTPL has some powerful policy implications. A limit on borrowing
is needed and appropriate to guarantee the success of a monetary union like the EMU. That
means that the SGP is important and rather needs strengthening than weakening. Furthermore,
demand management by national governments is generally effective as the FTPL induces impacts




The basic idea of the pure-sign-restriction approach is to consider only those impulse responses
heading in the desired direction for at least Z periods. Let a ∈ Rm be an impulse vector, if there
exists a matrix A such that Ω = AA′ with a being a column of A. Following the notation used
throughout the paper Ω denotes the covariance matrix, m denotes the number of variables in the
vector of dependent variables Xt, and p the lag length. Furthermore, let ei for i = 1, . . . , n be
the eigenvectors of Ω, normalized to form an orthonormal basis of Rm, and υi the corresponding
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For the application of the sign-restriction approach we make joint draws from both the posterior
distribution of the VAR parameters and a uniform distribution over the (m − 1)-dimensional
sphere (α1, . . . , αm−1). It is then possible to obtain the impulse vector a according to (5.1),
which then may be used to calculate the impulse responses. Then, if the impulse response fulfills
the sign restrictions imposed, we keep the draw. Otherwise we drop it from the further analysis.
5.2 Bayesian Analysis of Markov-Regime Switching Models
We consider a VAR of order p given by




BhS(t)xt−h + εt(St), (5.3)
where εt(St) is an normally distributed i.i.d. error term with mean zero and regime-dependent
covariance matrix Ω(St). µ(St) denotes a constant and B
h
S(t) is the matrix of coefficients for the
hth lag included. As indicated by St we assume that both the parameters included in B as well as
the covariance Ω can adopt k different states. In any period parameters and covariance matrix
may switch to a new state with a probability pij ≥ 0. We define the transition probabilities
for a switch from regime i to regime j as pij = p(St = j|St−1 = i). We then summarize these
probabilities in the transition matrix P with size (k × k).
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We aim at estimating the set of unknown parameters given by
λ ≡ {µ1, . . . , µk, B1, . . . Bk, Ω1, . . . , Ωk, P} .
In partitioned notation this expression reduces to λ ≡ {Θ, P}. Furthermore, it is convenient
to rewrite (5.3) in stacked form as a VAR(1) model, i.e.
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Furthermore, let X = (x1, . . . , xT ) be the vector of all observations.
5.2.1 The Likelihood Function
The contribution of the tth vector of observations xt to the likelihood conditional on the regime
St is given by













m denotes the number of variables in xt and X−1 = {x1, . . . , xT−1}, i.e. all observations up to
period T−1. Next, we exploit the recursiveness of (5.4) for the first p observations by substituting
for Xt−1. This yields
Xp = µ̄ + BXp−1 + ε̄p
= µ̄ + B(µ̄ + BXp−2 + ε̄p−1) + ε̄p
= µ̄ + Bµ̄ + Bε̄t−1 + ε̄t + B
2Xp−2








under the assumption that there is no regime shift prior to p. This enables us to write the






For the existence of E[Xp] it requires that all eigenvalues of B have absolute value less than
one. For the variance of Xp it follows




























= V (Ω, B).
We are now able to approximate l(Xp|Sp, λ), which is the contribution of the first p data
vectors to the likelihood, by








For the full likelihood conditional on the regimes we obtain, using (5.5) and (5.8)
L(X|ST , λ) = l(Xp|Sp, λ)
N∏
t=p+1
l(xt|St, X−1, λ). (5.9)
Integrating over all possible states we end up with the unconditional likelihood of the parameter





5.2.2 Generating the Regimes S using Gibbs-Sampling
We generate the regimes S with the help of multi-move Gibbs sampling. The idea is to obtain
the T elements in S within one draw conditional on λ and the observed data X. The starting
point is to make use of the structure of the underlying Markov chain. The density of the regimes
Pr(S|X,λ) can easily be rearranged in a multiplicative relationship as
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Pr(S|X,λ) = Pr(S1, . . . , ST |X,λ)
= Pr(ST |X,λ)Pr(ST−1, . . . , S1|ST , X−1, λ)




Pr(St|St+1, xt, λ). (5.11)
Knowing Pr(ST |X,λ) and Pr(St|St+1, xt, λ) we could first draw ST . Conditional on ST it
would then possible to obtain ST−1, and again conditional on ST−1 we could draw ST−2 etc.
Finally, Pr(St|St+1, xt, λ) can be determined using the filter proposed by Hamilton (1989). This
procedure demands initial values for S0. We will briefly outline in the following how these density
may reasonably be chosen.
5.2.3 Deriving the Initial Probabilities
Using the filter of Hamilton (1989) to compute Pr(ST |X,λ) requires initial values for Pr(S0|X).
By assuming that the economy was in a steady state in t = 0, we may use steady-state proba-
bilities for Pr(S0|X). The general condition for a steady-state probability is given by
P · Pr(S0|X) = Pr(S0|X), (5.12)
where P denotes the matrix of transition probabilities. This equation can be rearranged to
(I − P )Pr(S0|X) = 0, (5.13)
with I being a (k × k) identity matrix. We know that by construction the k probabilities in
the vector of Pr(S0|X) add up to one. Thus, with ι = (1, . . . , 1)′ we may express this fact in
vector notation as
ιPr(S0|X) = 1. (5.14)













We premultiply this expression by (M ′M)−1M ′ and obtain for the initial probabilities







5.2.4 Generating the Parameters
After having generated S, we are now able to formulate the conditional density of the parameters,
which is generally given by
Pr(λj|S, λ−j, X) ∝ L(X|S, λ) · p(S|λ) · p(λj), (5.17)
where λ−j denotes the set of all parameters except for λj.
5.3 Numerical Results of the Regime-Switching Approach
5.3.1 Germany
• Monetary Policy Rule: 1970-1990
mean Std. Dev. 2.5% Median 97.5%
Constant 2.7646 0.4729 2.1936 2.7281 3.3897
αY (S
M
t = 1) 0.1732 0.1158 0.0318 0.1686 0.3236
αY (S
M
t = 2) 0.3219 0.0817 0.2193 0.3218 0.4274
απ(S
M
t = 1) 0.4376 0.1125 0.2952 0.4354 0.5814
απ(S
M
t = 2) 1.1880 0.0821 1.0802 1.1883 1.2916
σ 1.5332 0.2624 1.2194 1.5043 1.8825
P11 0.8875 0.0556 0.8125 0.8957 0.9514
P12 0.1125 0.0556 0.0486 0.1043 0.1875
P21 0.0835 0.0485 0.0287 0.0745 0.1497
P22 0.9165 0.0485 0.8503 0.9255 0.9713
• Fiscal Policy Rule: 1970-1990
mean Std. Dev. 2.5% Median 97.5%
γG(S
F
t = 1) 0.5183 0.3220 0.2427 0.5072 0.7801
γG(S
F
t = 2) 0.1080 0.1064 -0.0191 0.1020 0.2383
γY (S
F
t = 1) -0.7624 0.7936 -1.8426 -0.6094 0.1438
γY (S
F
t = 2) 2.2330 0.4228 1.7168 2.2445 2.7549
γB(S
F
t = 1) 1.8741 0.4434 1.3428 1.9087 2.3784
γB(S
F
t = 2) 0.2997 0.0573 0.2243 0.3030 0.3693
σ 20.3249 4.0922 15.6124 19.8016 25.9082
P11 0.6076 0.1505 0.4079 0.6145 0.8036
P12 0.3924 0.1505 0.1964 0.3855 0.5921
P21 0.0546 0.0360 0.0198 0.0474 0.0972
P22 0.9454 0.0360 0.9028 0.9526 0.9802
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• Monetary Policy Rule: 1992-1998
mean Std. Dev. 2.5% Median 97.5%
Constant 1.6230 0.2720 1.2864 1.6144 1.9695
αY (S
M
t = 1) 0.1523 0.0880 0.0410 0.1543 0.2634
αY (S
M
t = 2) 0.1170 0.4006 -0.4583 0.2063 0.5569
απ(S
M
t = 1) 1.3231 0.0757 1.2258 1.3214 1.4195
απ(S
M
t = 2) 0.3943 0.2059 0.1632 0.3628 0.6709
σ 0.5099 0.1128 0.3792 0.4958 0.6582
P11 0.9346 0.0474 0.8705 0.9465 0.9827
P12 0.0654 0.0474 0.0173 0.0535 0.1295
P21 0.1121 0.0899 0.0189 0.0911 0.2379
P22 0.8879 0.0899 0.7621 0.9089 0.9811
• Fiscal Policy Rule: 1992-1998
mean Std. Dev. 2.5% Median 97.5%
γG(S
F
t = 1) 0.3086 0.6310 -0.1593 0.1969 0.9793
γG(S
F
t = 2) 0.4255 0.9010 -0.3309 0.2310 1.7786
γY (S
F
t = 1) 0.5137 1.1461 -0.9007 0.4374 2.0513
γY (S
F
t = 2) 1.7293 1.3828 -0.0993 1.7706 3.4856
γB(S
F
t = 1) 0.6230 0.7248 0.1766 0.5055 1.2901
γB(S
F
t = 2) 1.6827 1.0731 0.4424 1.6816 3.0818
σ 26.3741 11.5776 12.5658 24.8717 41.2548
P11 0.8114 0.2029 0.4945 0.8894 0.9853
P12 0.1886 0.2029 0.0147 0.1106 0.5055
P21 0.3304 0.2366 0.0343 0.3052 0.6683
P22 0.6696 0.2366 0.3317 0.6948 0.9657
5.3.2 Spain
• Monetary Policy Rule: 1986-1998
mean Std. Dev. 2.5% Median 97.5%
Constant 1.7709 0.8930 0.6063 1.7436 2.9575
αY (S
M
t = 1) 0.4791 0.5412 -0.0933 0.3151 1.3145
αY (S
M
t = 2) 0.2936 0.5126 -0.1851 0.1651 1.1361
απ(S
M
t = 1) 1.2563 0.4921 0.7427 1.0540 2.0008
απ(S
M
t = 2) 1.5664 0.5037 0.8184 1.7638 2.0911
σ 2.9396 0.7330 2.1268 2.8127 3.9220
P11 0.8550 0.1269 0.6667 0.8978 0.9733
P12 0.1450 0.1269 0.0267 0.1022 0.3333
P21 0.1150 0.1046 0.0235 0.0842 0.2502
P22 0.8850 0.1046 0.7498 0.9158 0.9765
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• Fiscal Policy Rule: 1986-1998
mean Std. Dev. 2.5% Median 97.5%
γG(S
F
t = 1) 0.8612 0.6127 0.0150 1.0024 1.3603
γG(S
F
t = 2) 0.2772 0.7770 -0.6998 0.3066 1.1376
γY (S
F
t = 1) -0.0094 0.8735 -1.0373 -0.0283 1.0961
γY (S
F
t = 2) 1.3900 1.2088 -0.1495 1.3752 2.9819
γB(S
F
t = 1) 0.3667 0.7124 -0.1175 0.1722 1.2231
γB(S
F
t = 2) 0.9781 0.9206 0.0991 0.7112 2.3303
σ 125.4221 29.9270 89.9012 122.1884 164.8915
P11 0.7769 0.2002 0.4703 0.8479 0.9624
P12 0.2231 0.2002 0.0376 0.1521 0.5297
P21 0.2735 0.2178 0.0381 0.2172 0.5939
P22 0.7265 0.2178 0.4061 0.7828 0.9619
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